

Chief Inspector
Air Accident Investigation Authority
Level G, Facility Building
1 Tung Fai Road
Hong Kong International Airport
Lantau, Hong Kong

Serious Incident Bulletin 7/2018

Aircraft types:	Aircraft 1: Bombardier BD-700-1A11 Global 5000 Aircraft 2: Boeing 737-81B
Registration:	Aircraft 1: P4-AVA Aircraft 2: B-1918
Years of manufacture:	Aircraft 1: 2013 Aircraft 2: 2014
Number and types of engines:	Aircraft 1: Two Rolls Royce BR700-710A2-20 turbo-fan engines Aircraft 2: Two CFM56-7B26E turbo-fan engines
Date and time of incident:	13 November 2018, 1947 hours LT (1147 hours UTC)
Place of incident:	Runway 07L, Hong Kong International Airport (VHHH)
Nature of incident:	RI-VAP: Runway Incursion Aircraft 2 landed on the active runway prior to Aircraft 1 vacating the runway on rapid exit taxiway A7. Estimated separation at the time of the Aircraft 2 landing was 1 800 metres.
Types of flights:	Aircraft 1: Non-scheduled ferry flight Aircraft 2: Scheduled Public Transport Flight
Persons on board:	Aircraft 1: Crew: 3 Passenger: Nil Aircraft 2: Crew: 8 Passenger: 171

Fatalities:	Nil
Serious injuries:	Nil
Licences of the Pilots-in-command and First Officers of both aircraft	Valid Airline Transport Pilot Licence
Air Movement Controller (AMC)'s licence	Valid Air Traffic Controller's Licence
Source of information:	Investigation

Aircraft Serious Incident

Bombardier BD-700-1A11 Global 5000 (Registration Mark P4-AVA) and Boeing 737-81B (Registration Mark B-1918) on 13 November 2018

Preliminary Report

(All times are in Hong Kong local time which is UTC+8 hours.)

1. On 13 November 2018 two aircraft were sequenced by Hong Kong Air Traffic Control (ATC) for an approach and landing to Hong Kong International Airport (VHHH).
2. The lead aircraft in the landing sequence – Aircraft 1 – was a Bombardier Global 5000, registration P4-AVA operated by MS Aviation GmbH which had departed from Clark International Airport (RPLC) to VHHH on a ferry flight earlier that day. The Commander was the ‘Pilot Flying’ (PF) and the first officer was the ‘Pilot Monitoring’ (PM).
3. The second aircraft in the landing sequence was Aircraft 2, a China Southern Airlines Boeing 737-81B, registration B-1918, flight number CSN6045, which had departed from Yiwu Airport (ZSYW), China to VHHH. The first officer was the PF and the Commander was the PM.
4. At 1945 hours Aircraft 2 communicated with ATC for an approach to landing on Runway 07L, the crew were advised by ATC to expect a late landing clearance.
5. At 1946 hours Aircraft 1 landed on Runway 07L and taxied towards rapid exit taxiway A7. During taxiing, there were several radio communications between ATC and Aircraft 1 concerning expediting vacating the runway.
6. At 1947 hours Aircraft 2 was given clearance by ATC, touching down on Runway 7L approximately 14 seconds later. At the time of the landing, Aircraft 1 was still taxiing on the runway and short of the rapid exit taxiway A7.
7. The estimated separation between the two aircraft when Aircraft 2 landed was 1 800 metres.
8. The meteorological aerodrome weather report for VHHH at 1930 hours indicated that the wind was from 100 degrees at 10 knots. The visibility was 10 kilometres or above.

9. The Chief Inspector ordered an investigation into the circumstances and causes of the serious incident in accordance with the requirements of Hong Kong Civil Aviation (Investigation of Accidents) Regulations and Annex 13 to the Convention on International Civil Aviation. The following accident investigation authorities were notified:

State	Aircraft 1	Aircraft 2
State of Design and State of Manufacture	Transportation Safety Board of Canada	National Transportation Safety Board of the United States of America
State of Registry	Aruba Aviation Safety Board	Office of Aviation Safety, Civil Aviation Administration of China
State of the Operator	Federal Safety Investigation Authority of Austria	

10. The investigation team conducted interviews with the flight crew of Aircraft 1 and the ATC controller, and received aircraft flight documents, maintenance records, flight data, and weather information. The relevant recordings of the Air Traffic Management System (ATMS) surveillance, Advance Surface Movement Guidance Control System (A-SMGCS) and ATC/Pilot radio communication were also collected.
11. The investigation team is conducting detailed analysis of the data and information collected in order to determine the circumstances and causes of this serious incident. During the course of the investigation, should any safety recommendation be necessary, it will be promulgated immediately.

14 December 2018

This Bulletin contains information relating to the serious incident collected up to the time of issue. The information must be regarded as tentative and subject to alteration or correction if additional evidence becomes available.